

# CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA AND NIGERIA DEVELOPMENT

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**Abstract:** This study examined China's foreign policy in Africa and Nigeria development. The study was anchored on the dependency theory as propounded by Dos Santos in 1970. The study adopted ex-post research design while data was gotten from secondary source such as textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, magazines and internet and the data generated was analyzed through content analysis. The findings of the study showed that China's foreign policy interests in Africa is centered on political, economic and security interest and China's foreign policy has not resulted in development in Nigeria, as Chinese firms in Nigeria employ more than 84 percent of local labour, despite the fact that few of these employees are technical or managerial staffs. Based on the findings the study recommended among others; that Africa should take advantage of China's economic, political and ideological interest in Africa as China should be encouraged to strengthen and improve its co-operation with Africa in other areas such as engineering and technology and the government of Nigeria should put down strong laws as well as implement the laws, that will lead to Chinese firms putting more Nigerians into managerial and technical positions.

**Keywords:** Policy, dependency, security, technology, economy.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The crisis surrounding the Tiananmen Square crackdown on June 4, 1989, and the harsh and repeated criticism leveled against China's human rights record by the developed world since that date have shaped China's foreign policy towards Africa. Previously, as the Cold War thawed and China's modernization agenda necessitated foreign investment and technological support, the African continent's importance to China had dwindled (Yung-lo, 1989). Though Chinese leaders gave rhetorical lip service to subjects like South-South cooperation, the truth was that Beijing was primarily concerned with preserving close ties with countries from which it could economically gain. Exhortations and propaganda based on Maoist principles vanished, in stark contrast to China's posture in the 1960s and 1970s, because Deng Xiaoping's socialist modernization' agenda required economic investment as well as a non-conflictual approach. As a result, China's foreign policy formulation prioritized non-ideological relations with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan centered on developing trade links and cooperation. After 1970, China's foreign policy was mostly focused on promoting Deng's economic modernization program, and while the country remained sympathetic to Africa, it was preoccupied with economic issues. This translated into a policy of supporting international stability and economic interdependence in the conduct of foreign affairs. Africa's failure to develop its economy efficiently and open up to the international market ran counter to Chinese policy goals, and the continent's increasingly peripheral role in global (read superpower) geopolitics led to a halt to closer Chinese involvement. In essence, Beijing not only saw Africa as mostly irrelevant in its pursuit for modernization, but it also recognized that the premise for supporting anti-Soviet movements on the continent was no longer acceptable (Hsiung, 1988). Furthermore, because the end of superpower struggle coincided with China's economic expansion, Africa became a significant target for China. During this time, Chinese firms are urged to collaborate with African firms to process raw materials, establish assembly plants, and participate in other technical projects. Cacao

production in Cote D'Ivoire, plate glass manufacturing in Kenya, iron cooperative activities in Zimbabwe, the establishment of an investment and development trade center in Mali, and mining and the opening of the first Chinese bank in Zambia are just a few of the African countries where joint ventures have been formed (Hairong, 2007). While Chinese involvement during the Cold War was largely described as ideological, Chinese authorities now describe their policy as "flexible, differentiated, and proactive" (Mohan & Power, 2008). While China has argued that it places an emphasis on reciprocal cooperation on the ground, such as political equality and common confidence, win-win economic alliances, and the establishment of cultural networks, the Western discourse has continued to claim that China engages in neocolonialism, promotes corruption, supports illiberal and authoritarian regimes, undermines anti-poverty efforts, and is careless in environmental issues in Africa. Long before China's involvement in Africa, the continent's industry was severely harmed by the Washington and post-Washington Consensuses in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively (Hairong, 2007). As a result, the Beijing Consensus has become more relevant for many African countries than the Washington Consensus. The Beijing Consensus advocated for increased government engagement in the economy, fewer loan conditions, Chinese technology, enterprises, and labor, and no technology transfer (Van Dijk, 2009). When it comes to China's foreign policy in Africa, there are still many flaws, as evidenced by Nigeria's trade, investment, infrastructure, and oil industry. However, since the 1990s, greater Chinese imports have hastened the demise of a domestic manufacturing sector already crippled by decades of mismanagement, unstable electricity, and expensive financing and operating costs. Import bans on textiles and other domestically manufactured items failed to stop the flow of commodities, but instead spurred smuggling, particularly of Chinese-made textiles suited to Nigerian tastes. The textile industry in Nigeria suffered a significant loss of jobs as a result of these ban-busting imports. The failure of the Nigerian government to control imports of substandard Chinese-made goods, mainly generator sets and consumer electronics. Rather than being a Chinese government conspiracy, the flow of defective imports is driven by opportunistic Nigerian dealers eager to maximize the quantity of commodities they can purchase on expensive purchasing trips to China, regardless of their quality.

## RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This paper addressed several objectives which includes to; (1) examine China's foreign policy interest in Africa; (2) analyze factors inhibiting China's foreign policy in Nigeria, and; (3) investigate whether China's foreign policy has brought about development in Nigeria.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study is anchored on the dependency theory as propounded by Dos Santos in 1970. He does, however, believe that reliance is "a scenario in which the economic development and extension of one economy is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the latter is subjected." When some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can only do so as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development, the relationship of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, takes on the form of dependence" (Dos Santos, 1970). Nkrumah (1968) defined a situation in which a state is officially independent and sovereign, but its economic system, and hence its political philosophy, is controlled by a neocolonial power. Dependency theory adds the idea of peripherality or satellite status to the concept of neo-colonialism (Smith, 1996). This scenario depicts the reality of relations between developing and developed countries, in which dominant countries' expansion had primarily negative consequences for developing countries' economy and development (the dependent ones). Development and underdevelopment, according to André Gunder Frank, are "two sides of the same coin: the industrialized world's development was and is made possible only by the Third World's equivalent underdevelopment" (Randall & Theobald, 1985). "No country that has been securely linked to the metropolis as a satellite through inclusion into the world capitalist system has earned the rank of an economically developed country," he added (Frank, 1969). The most significant challenge facing Third World economies, according to Dos Santos, was the unequal way in which they were integrated into the international system (Wilber, 1973). The rise and wealth of colonial empires contributed to the impoverishment of the colonies during the colonial era. The colonies' economic policies were geared at meeting the wants and interests of metropolitan consumers. Following independence, the former colonies became asymmetrically dependence on industrial economies, primarily exchanging semi-finished and finished products, capital, and technology for fuel and raw material exports. The relevance of the theory to this study is obvious given the fact the Nigeria is a country that is blessed with natural resources but it is highly dependent on China for most of its finished goods that are used in the country, thereby not giving Nigeria the opportunity to develop

## 2. METHODOLOGY

Given, the problem of the paper, this paper adopted the Ex Post Facto (After the Fact) research design. Materials for this paper was sourced through secondary sources of data which included here are textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, magazines, official documents from the government, internet materials, among others. Content analysis was used to analyse data so generated. This is with a view to identify logical sequence of data as well as trends.

## 3. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

At this point, tables and figures was presented that help to address the three objectives raised. In other words, this section is aimed at establishing an empirical link of China's foreign policy in Africa and Nigeria development.

**Table 1: China's foreign policy interest in Africa**

| China's foreign policy interest | China's foreign policy interest out come in Africa   |
|---------------------------------|--|
| <b>Political Interest</b>       | On critical issues in the international arena and at multilateral forums, China relies greatly on diplomatic support and collaboration from African countries. |
| <b>Economic Interest</b>        | China's drive for natural resources, including energy reserves, minerals, and raw materials, directly fuels the country's internal economic growth.            |
| <b>Security Interest</b>        | As a result of the volatile political situations in Africa, Chinese citizens face significant security dangers at both the local and national levels.          |
| <b>Ideological Interest</b>     | The influence of the China Model in Africa, which is a necessary soft power for China to become a global power   |

Source: Computed by the researcher based on data from [https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/africa-in-china-web\\_cmg7.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/africa-in-china-web_cmg7.pdf)

From table 1 showing China's foreign policy interest in Africa, Political interest, on critical issues in the international arena and at multilateral forums, China relies greatly on diplomatic support and collaboration from African countries. Economic interest, China's drive for natural resources, including energy reserves, minerals, and raw materials, directly fuels the country's internal economic growth. Security interest, as a result of the volatile political situations in Africa, Chinese citizens face significant security dangers at both the local and national levels. Ideological interest, the influence of the China model in Africa, which is a necessary soft power for China to become a global power.

### China's political foreign policy interest in Africa

China's overriding goal in the past has been to get diplomatic recognition from African countries and to develop official ties that would bolster the communist regime's political legitimacy. During the 1960s, when China was "striking with both fists" (in two directions: toward the US and Russia), its support for African countries significantly eased the pressure on China caused by the two big powers' worldwide isolation (Baijia, 2011). China's emotional attachment to Africa has remained a constant in the relationship since then. Second, on critical problems in the international arena and at multilateral forums, China substantially relies on diplomatic support and cooperation from African countries. More than one-quarter of UN member states and votes are currently held by 54 African countries. China's political agenda has relied on African countries' backing at the United Nations. When 26 African countries voted for the People's Republic of China to reclaim its seat at the United Nations in 1972, China saw the relevance and worth of Africa's political role. Africa accounted for more than a third of the countries who voted in favor of the resolution. Following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, Beijing was subjected to severe international isolation and Western sanctions. Six southern African countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique) stepped forward to save China from the quagmire in August 1989 by inviting Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to visit. Following the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989, the first head of state and foreign minister to visit China were both from Africa. Since 1991, China has made Africa the first stop for Chinese foreign ministers in the new year as a token of gratitude for this enormous political favor (Jianbo, 2013). China has relied on African countries' backing at the UN for its political agenda,

as the 54 African countries make for more than a quarter of UN member states. Tibet became a contentious sore spot for China at the UN Human Rights Council in 2008, just before the Beijing Olympics. To defuse and prevent hostile comments or acts, China relies on African countries to remain silent or issue remarks in support of China's Tibet policy (Shinn, 2011). Today, China looks on Africa for support on topics ranging from human rights to UN reform, regional security to China's core national interests. Ending Taiwan's diplomatic presence on the continent is another of China's primary political goals in its engagement with Africa. For Beijing, adopting the One China policy and accepting Beijing rather than Taipei as China's sole legal representative is an issue of core regime legitimacy. Since the formation of the People's Republic of China, the tug-of-war between Beijing and Taipei over diplomatic ties with African countries has lasted more than six decades. Burkina Faso, Swaziland, and So Tomé and Príncipe are the only African countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The Gambia established diplomatic relations with China in 1974, renewed them in 1995, and then severed them in November 2013. As of January 2014, it has failed to reestablish diplomatic relations with Beijing. Burkina Faso established diplomatic relations with China in 1973, but moved to Taiwan in 1994, while So Tomé and Príncipe established diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1992, but shifted to Taiwan in 1997. Since the 1990s, Taiwan's "check book" diplomacy has been successful in gaining recognition from a number of African countries, including So Tomé and Príncipe (1997, \$30 million loan), Niger (1992, \$50 million loan), and Chad (1997, \$125 million loan) (Dan & Chien, 2008). China, on the other hand, has been winning the diplomatic struggle and has steadily pushed Taiwan out of Africa, thanks to the vast financial resources now available to Beijing.

### **China's economic foreign policy interest in Africa**

Despite Africa's political relevance, China has prioritized economic considerations in both its domestic and international agendas since the reform and opening up began. This is the direct effect of Beijing's strategy of diversifying and consolidating its legitimacy by providing economic progress to the broader public. The six decades of Sino-African economic cooperation, according to Chinese analysts, may be loosely divided into three stages: Between 1949 and 1979, China's economic activities in Africa were primarily driven by its political agenda, with a focus on providing economic assistance to newly independent African nations in order to foster diplomatic relations, support Africa's "anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism struggle," and gain international support for the People's Republic of China (Hongming, 2006). China's foreign policy evolved from supporting domestic economic development to promoting reform and opening up in 1979 through the mid-1990s. As a result of this transformation, China's aims for Africa policy have shifted from obtaining political favor to encouraging "mutually advantageous economic cooperation," and from assisting to boosting "service contracts, investment, and commerce" (Anshan, 2008).

In China's foreign economic relations, the philosophy of "utilizing both home and international markets and resources" began to take hold in the mid-1990s. After a tour to six African countries in 1996, then-President Jiang Zemin introduced the "Going Out" strategy, which resulted in a boom in China's foreign economic cooperation (Yangyong, 2008). The Politburo then approved the policy as a national strategy in 2000, and it has been in effect since then. For various reasons, Africa is an ideal fit for China's Going Out plan. To begin with, Africa's abundant energy reserves, minerals, and raw materials directly support China's search for natural resources to bolster its domestic economic growth. By the early 2000s, China had amassed a sizable foreign exchange reserve, despite the fact that domestic energy and natural resource depletion was becoming a serious economic constraint. Second, compared to the problematic states it found in other regions of the world, China's active cultivation of African countries in earlier decades had resulted in comparatively favorable relationships, making Africa a friendly, appealing partner.

Meanwhile, China was looking to Africa for market opportunities. Chinese manufacturing companies have the distinct benefit of being able to produce textiles, electronics, and other products at a low cost, which meets the market demands of developing African countries (Yingji, 2006). As a result of the global financial crisis of 2008 and its devastating impact on China's export sectors, Africa's relevance as a market for China has grown dramatically (Qinmei, 2013). When demand for Chinese goods dwindled in stagnating Western economies, China's export sectors were forced to look for new markets to fill the gap. As a result, some commentators connect the global financial crisis to the fact that China overtook the United States as Africa's greatest trading partner during the same time period. Furthermore, as China aims to modernize its industrial economy and advance up the global supply chain, Africa has been highlighted as the ideal place for China's labor-intensive industries due to its large and untapped labor resources. China desires more capital-intensive, high-tech sectors and jobs by moving low-skilled jobs and labor-intensive industries to Africa in order to better its own development model and quality.

### China's foreign policy interest in terms of security in Africa

Africa does not represent a direct physical danger to China's immediate national security or the security of its perimeter due to its great geographical distance. However, as China's economic activity and people presence on the continent develop at a rapid pace, the physical security of Chinese investments and citizens has emerged as Beijing's most pressing concern. As of October 2012, there were at least 1 million Chinese living in Africa (Neteast Data Blog, 2012). As a result of Africa's tumultuous political situations, these individuals face severe security dangers at both the local and national levels.

### China's foreign policy interest in terms of ideology in Africa

Historically, during the Cold War and prior to China's reform and opening up, ideology was a major determinant of China's African policy (Guijin, 2013). During this time, China's policy toward Africa was based on the idea that China should be the frontrunner in the developing world in the fight against colonialism, imperialism, and revisionism. The emphasis on ideology stems from China's need to find friendly diplomatic space to preserve its existence in the face of a hostile foreign environment. Despite China's own economic troubles, this ideology-driven approach resulted in significant contributions to Africa, which was gradually abandoned after 1979. Since then, China has stopped using ideology (communism, socialism, or capitalism) to govern its dealings with African political groups and countries. Instead, it has established broad ties with all African nations that support China's one-China policy.

Economic interests and practical political factors, such as gaining international sympathizers, legitimacy, and backing for the Chinese leadership, drive China's non-discriminatory ties with all African countries.

China's ideological interest in Africa did not vanish as a result of the country's shift in emphasis to economic development in this respect. Instead, it has taken on a new, more subtle shape, one that promotes and popularizes China's growth model, so bolstering Beijing's legitimacy. The less isolated China feels as more countries identify with and emulate Beijing's approach. Beijing wants non-Western, non-democratic governments in Africa to grow and prosper because they help China's political system gain legitimacy and reduce its international isolation by demonstrating that Western democracy is not a universal value and that the Western democratic system does not have to apply in every country. As a result, any success of authoritarian governments in Africa, such as Sudan, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is seen as constituting support for the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy.

**Table 2: Factors inhibiting China foreign policy in Nigeria**

| <b>Factors Inhibiting China's Foreign Policy in Nigeria</b>                           | <b>China's foreign policy out come in Nigeria</b>  |
|---|--|
| <b>The imbalance in the structure of level of the trade between Nigeria and China</b> | The severe trade imbalance has not only maintained, but has even worsened.   |
| <b>Imbalance of technological transfer between China and Nigeria</b>                  | Chinese enterprises bring entire equipment with Chinese technicians into the nation, the technology transferred from Chinese FDI is negligible.                    |
| <b>China exploitative tendency in Nigeria and economic sabotage</b>                   | Chinese investments have sparked both suspicion and appreciation, since they defy current operational norms and accepted business principles by trick or by crook. |
| <b>China's substandard products brought into Nigeria</b>                              | China has been dumping substandard items in Nigeria  |

Source: Computed by the researcher based on data from <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/08/04/how-china-is-exploiting-nigeria-with-greek-gifts-economic-sabotage/>

Table 2 showing the factors inhibiting China's foreign policy in Nigeria. The imbalance in the structure of level of the trade between Nigeria and China (The severe trade imbalance has not only maintained, but has even worsened). Imbalance of technological transfer between China and Nigeria (Chinese enterprises bring entire equipment with Chinese technicians into the nation, the technology transferred from Chinese FDI is negligible). China exploitative tendency in Nigeria and economic sabotage (Chinese investments have sparked both suspicion and appreciation, since they defy

current operational norms and accepted business principles by trick or by crook). China's substandard products brought into Nigeria (China has been dumping substandard items in Nigeria).

### **The imbalance in the structure of level of the trade between Nigeria and China**

Bilateral trade has grown at an exponential rate since China and Nigeria signed a trade and investment promotion and protection agreement in 2000; the value of trade reached USD 17.7 billion in 2010, nearly ten times its level just ten years before. However, while Nigerian exports to China have more than doubled, they have not kept pace with Chinese exports to Nigeria. As a result, a significant trade imbalance has not only maintained but actually worsened. Chinese exports accounted for 66.7 percent of overall bilateral trade in 2000 and 87.3 percent in 2010. Nigeria had grown to become China's fourth-largest African trading partner and the continent's second-largest Chinese export destination by 2010. After several years, Nigeria's bilateral trade relationship with China reveals that the most evident pattern in the relationship is still imbalanced. It means that, despite an increase in bilateral trade volume, bilateral economic relations have favored China, giving the impression of a lopsided distribution of advantages from bilateral trade (Bukarambe, 2005). Crude oil has supplanted agricultural commodities as Nigeria's primary export to China, while Nigeria's imports from that country have shifted from consumer items to capital and investment goods. As a result, Nigeria's exports to China are primarily primary commodities, while its imports from China are primarily manufactured items. Nigeria's strength is based on crude oil production, which provides for over 90% of the country's foreign profits (Michael, 2006).

### **Imbalance of technological transfer between China and Nigeria**

Poor technology has hindered Nigeria's attempts to engage in the global economy to a considerable extent. As a result, China has emerged as its most valuable technology partner. However, there has been some criticism about China's role in this (Akongbowa, 2008). Increasingly, the technology transmitted from Chinese FDI is small because most Chinese enterprises bring entire equipment with Chinese personnel into the nation. This was the case with the state government of Zamfara. The state government has agreed to spend \$250 million on the development of three new processing and smelting plants. Chinese businesses owned 90 percent of the joint venture projects, while the Zamfara government owned 10%. The Chinese companies will design the projects, choose appropriate technology, purchase all equipment, install, and operate them, while the government of Zamfara will give land, obtain both exploration mining licenses, provide security for the Chinese investment, and employ 5,000 local miners (This Day Newspaper, 2010).

### **China exploitative tendency in Nigeria and economic sabotage**

Chinese investments elicit widespread suspicion of a new form of colonialism as well as praise in Nigeria and across Africa, but for the most part, their arrival and stay attract undue attention and privileges while flouting existing operational guidelines and prevailing business principles by hook or crook. As China grew as a global economic power, its need for natural resources grew as well. China imports huge amounts of copper and oil from Africa to feed its manufacturing of furniture, wood processing, pharmaceuticals, computers, transportation equipment, and textiles in order to meet its demand. They have billion-dollar investments in everything from agriculture to construction. China's investments in Nigeria's economy have also stymied the country's political changes. In Africa, China's economic support is growing unemployment and wreaking havoc on job growth. China is shamelessly abandoning its pledge to bring about change in the midst of investments, exports, and new infrastructure. In Nigeria, Chinese companies use unlawful ways to attain their objectives. Mining on tiny pieces of land of less than 25 acres, for example, is confined to Nigerian natives by law. Despite the fact that regulations make it obvious that prospecting for gold and other valuable stones with local landowners is unlawful, China continues to do so. They use a variety of strategies to utilize Nigeria's resources, all of which have an impact on the local and national economies.

### **China's substandard products brought into Nigeria**

In Nigeria, China has been dumping inferior goods. According to the news story, "80 percent of the fake items that come into Nigeria are originating from Asia, with China as the real guilty party," SON's DG, Joseph Odumodu, was quoted as saying, "80 percent of the fake items that come into Nigeria are originating from Asia, with China as the real guilty party." This bolsters the argument that China is dumping substandard goods into Nigeria. It also addresses the argument that China, as a global power, is suffocating Nigerian producers by dumping shoddy and sub-standard goods in the country (Obiorah, Kew & Tanko, 2008; Obiorah, 2006; Sanusi, 2013).

**Table 3: China's foreign policy and development in Nigeria**

| China's foreign policy and development in Nigeria | China's foreign policy out come on development in Nigeria  |
|---|--|
| <b>Labour Practices</b>                           | In Nigeria, Chinese companies employ more than 84 percent of the labor force, yet few of these workers are skilled or managerial.  |
| <b>Shoddy Chinese Goods</b>                       | Nigerians have complained about substandard work and criticisms about Chinese goods.   |
| <b>Industrial Displacement</b>                    | The increase in foreign textile imports, which began in 2005, has contributed to the near-complete elimination of Nigeria's domestic textile industry.   |
| <b>Intellectual Property Rights</b>               | Nigerian textile traders frequently send their ideas to potential production partners in China through smartphone camera to obtain bids, only to have these unique designs appear elsewhere without authorization. |

Source: Computed by the researcher based on data from [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337085826\\_An\\_Analysis\\_of\\_China-Nigeria\\_Economic\\_Cooperations](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337085826_An_Analysis_of_China-Nigeria_Economic_Cooperations)

From table 3 showing China's foreign policy and development in Nigeria. Labour Practices, in Nigeria, Chinese companies employ more than 84 percent of the labor force, yet few of these workers are skilled or managerial. Shoddy Chinese Goods, Nigerians have complained about substandard work and criticisms about Chinese goods. Industrial displacement, the increase in foreign textile imports, which began in 2005, has contributed to the near-complete elimination of Nigeria's domestic textile industry. Intellectual property rights, Nigerian textile traders frequently send their ideas to potential production partners in China through smartphone camera to obtain bids, only to have these unique designs appear elsewhere without authorization.

### **Labor Practices**

Complaints about labor standards abound, particularly the impression that Chinese construction businesses use Chinese workers rather than locally hired labor (Obiorah & Tanko, 2008). In Nigeria, Chinese companies employ more than 84 percent of the workforce, yet few of these workers are technical or managerial (Kobus & Bryan, 2018). Conditions in Chinese-owned industries have also been a source of dissatisfaction, with Chinese enterprises in Nigeria being blamed for closing due to a perceived lack of local expertise. There was even a suggestion that they mistreat their employees on occasion. According to certain reports, the working conditions of Nigerians in certain Chinese enterprises do not comply with Nigerian labor laws or the International Labour Organization's standards. In 2002, a number of Nigerian workers were killed after being trapped inside a locked Chinese-owned factory that caught fire (Kobus & Bryan, 2018).

### **Shoddy Chinese Goods**

One of the most prominent criticisms observed in Nigerian news media is that of substandard Chinese goods. The problem was so acute that it was brought up during bilateral discussions in Beijing. "It is worrisome to see sub-standard industrial goods being imported to Nigeria from China," according to a Nigerian account of the meeting. "Given the common knowledge that very high-quality goods are being exported from China to other parts of the world including the United States and Europe, the average Nigerian believed every sub-standard product in Nigeria was from China" (Nwosu, 2011). "Responding to the influx of China's inferior goods into the Nigerian market, Wali said this was another sad development facilitated by Nigerian businessmen, who came to China to make specifications for such inferior but profitable goods in the Nigerian market than the high-quality Chinese products, which were in great demand in Europe, Asia, and America," the Nigerian ambassador to China, Alhaji Aminu Bashir Wali, told a Nigerian newspaper (Nwosu, 2011). Nigerians fly to China and work with Chinese producers to make goods based on certain standards. As a result, it's more of a collaboration between Nigerian criminals and their Chinese counterparts. The comment is intriguing since it implies that Nigerians are receiving lower-quality Chinese goods than Americans or Europeans, rather than those Chinese goods are of poor quality globally. It also blames Nigerian "criminals" who fly to China in search of shady items.

Nigeria's neighbors, such as Benin and Cameroon, engage in informal trading (read: smuggling) over the country's borders. It's impossible to say how much of this illegal trafficking occurs, but Kate Meagher thinks that if strictly intra-African commerce accounts for around 6% of overall West African trade, then informal trade accounts for roughly 4–5%. (Adebajo & Abdul, 2008).


### Industrial Displacement

Nigeria has traditionally implemented a high level of protectionism, including tariffs, import licenses, customs processes, and restrictions, among other techniques. The Multi-Fibre Arrangement of 1994, which governed global commerce in textiles and garments, was replaced by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 2004 by the World Trade Organization. Beginning in 2005, this transition resulted in a boom in foreign textile imports, which contributed to the virtual extinction of Nigeria's domestic textile sector. Some of the new imports are secondhand European clothing, but the majority are of Chinese origin. Nigerian industry leaders said that 65 textile mills had shuttered and 150,000 workers had lost their employment as of early 2005. (Taylor, 2018). Factory closures occurred in Kaduna and Kano, where modern textile manufacturing began before independence, and by 2012, most of the fabric in Kano's Kantin Kwari textile market was Chinese (Renee, 2015). Some of these shipments, as well as other commodities, were smuggled into Nigeria by Chinese and Nigerian traders (Obiorah & Tanko, 2008).

The Nigerian government previously prohibited textile imports, however this prohibition was abolished in 2010. In Nigeria, the reaction to the industrial displacement has been varied. Textile companies and workers, understandably, are displeased with the situation. "Not surprisingly, textile union leaders and retrenched textile workers are dissatisfied with mill closures in Kaduna and Kano, which they partly attribute to Nigerian textiles being undersold by the illegal importation of cheap, poor quality Chinese textiles through Nigeria's porous borders, even if they recognize Nigerian traders' collusion in this process," writes Elisha Renee. Despite the merchandise arriving all the way from China, Nigerian cloth traders are thrilled with the scenario because they have cheaper goods and a faster turnaround time for orders (Renee, 2015).

### Intellectual Property Rights

Finally, the topic of intellectual property rights is regularly brought up. Nigerian textile traders frequently send their ideas to potential production partners in China through smartphone camera to obtain bids, only to have these unique designs appear elsewhere without authorisation (Renee, 2015). Some Nigerian partners of Chinese enterprises in FTZs and other manufacturing ventures have expressed this sentiment.




**Figure 1: Export of goods from Nigeria to China from 2005-2015 (USD Million)**

Source: Computed by the researcher based on data from [https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JEMEAA/Journals/Volume-01\\_Issue-2/JEMEAA\\_01\\_2\\_Jackson.pdf](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JEMEAA/Journals/Volume-01_Issue-2/JEMEAA_01_2_Jackson.pdf)

From the figure 1 showing export of good from Nigeria to China from 2005 to 2015 in USD million. In 2005 good exported amounted to \$908, 2006 it reduced to \$478, 2007 it increased to \$926, while in 2008 there was a slight reduction to \$878, in 2009 there was an increase to \$1,547, it still increased to \$1,840 in 2010, continuing it further increased to \$2,722 in 2011, while there was a reduction in 2012 to \$2,181, and further increase to \$2,658 in 2013, it still increased to \$4,573 in 2014 and a decrease in 2015 to \$2131.





**Figure 2: Import of goods from China to Nigeria from 2005-2015 (USD Million)**

Source: Computed by the researcher based on data from [https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JEMEAA/Journals/Volume-01\\_Issue-2/JEMEAA\\_01\\_2\\_Jackson.pdf](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JEMEAA/Journals/Volume-01_Issue-2/JEMEAA_01_2_Jackson.pdf)

From the figure 2 showing Import of goods from China to Nigeria from 2005 to 2015 in USD million. In 2005 good imported amounted to \$1,398, 2006 it increased to \$1,755, 2007 it still increased to \$2,349, while in 2008 it further increased to \$4,190, in 2009 there was a decrease to \$3,400, and an increase to \$4,159 in 2010, continuing it further increased to \$5,717 in 2011, and further increase in 2012 to \$5,785, and further increase to \$7,487 in 2013, it still increased to \$9,603 in 2014 and a decrease in 2015 to \$8,483.

#### 4. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The findings of the study revealed that China's foreign policy interests in Africa is centered on political interests, with the ultimate goal of diplomatic recognition from African countries and the formation of formal ties that improve the communist regime's political legitimacy. The study's findings also revealed that China's economic interest stems from Africa's abundant energy reserves, minerals, and raw materials, which directly drive China's quest for natural resources to support its domestic economic growth. While China's security objectives in Africa are largely defensive, they are focused at defending its current economic interests and citizens, as Chinese assets and nationals are particularly vulnerable in less-developed, politically unstable parts of the continent.

The findings of the study also revealed an imbalance in knowledge transfer between China and Nigeria, with technology transmitted from Chinese FDI being minor because most Chinese enterprises bring entire equipment with Chinese professionals into the nation. This was the case with the state government of Zamfara. The state government has agreed to spend \$250 million on the development of three new processing and smelting plants. Chinese businesses owned 90 percent of the joint venture projects, while the Zamfara government owned 10%. However, the investigation discovered that China has been dumping substandard commodities in Nigeria, with China being the real guilty party, as 80 percent of the phony items that enter Nigeria originate from Asia. Finally, the study's findings revealed that Nigeria's principal commodity exports to China are primarily primary commodities, whereas manufactured items account for the majority of its imports from China. However, in 2014, Nigeria exported \$4,572 worth of commodities to China, while China imported \$9,603 worth of goods from Nigeria, demonstrating a trade imbalance.

The findings of the study revealed that China's foreign policy has not resulted in development in Nigeria, as many Nigerians have complained that Chinese firms in Nigeria employ more than 84 percent of local labor, despite the fact that few of these employees are technical or managerial, and that Chinese firms occasionally mistreat their workers. The study also discovered that, starting in 2005, industrial displacement has resulted in a boom in foreign textile imports, which has contributed to the virtual elimination of Nigeria's domestic textile sector. Finally, the study discovered that Nigerian textile traders frequently send their designs to potential manufacturing partners in China via smartphone camera in order to solicit bids, only to have these unique designs appear elsewhere without approval, which is a violation of Nigerian intellectual property rights.

## 5. CONCLUSION

The study concluded that China's foreign policy interest in Africa includes, political, economic, security and ideology. However, it was also concluded that imbalance in the structural level of trade, technology and China's exploitative tendency are factors inhibiting the policy of China in Nigeria. Finally, it was concluded that China's foreign policy has not brought about development in Nigeria

## 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

Giving the findings of the study it was recommended that:

- 1) Africa should take advantage of China's economic, political and ideological interest in Africa as China should be encouraged to strengthen and improve its co-operation with Africa in other areas such as engineering and technology.
- 2) Nigeria's government should make a concerted effort to police its borders in order to prevent the influx of inferior Chinese goods, which would discourage local industry.
- 3) The government of Nigeria should put down strong laws as well as implement the laws, that will lead to Chinese firms putting more Nigerians into managerial and technical positions.

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